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ABSTRACT 
The Indonesian State Islamic Higher Education (PTAIN) system was created to 
encourage a progressive form of Islam to oppose political Islam and to be apolitical. 
Because PTAIN are the official government form of Islamic higher education, 
PTAIN faculty members can be important opinion makers in the Indonesian 
Islamic community. PTAIN are critical to understanding the Indonesian Islamic 
community because they engage in innovative scholarship on Islamic theology, 
ethics, law, and practice and in the education of young Muslim leaders in many 
fields. This article explores some of the ways PTAIN have been politicized to play a 
role in the debates about the future of Indonesian Islam which is developing (or at 
least showing) more complex variations. It offers a theoretical model for 
understanding the variation found in Islam. 
Keywords: Islamic Higher Education, Politicized.  
ABSTRAK 
Pendidikan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (PTAIN) Indonesia diciptakan untuk mendorong 
Islam yang progresif dalam rangka menentang Islam politik dan menjadi apolitis. Karena 
PTAIN merupakan penjelmaan pemerintahan yang resmi dalam pendidikan tinggi Islam, civitas 
akademik PTAIN dapat menjadi pembuat opini penting dalam masyarakat Islam Indonesia. 
PTAIN sangat penting untuk memahami masyarakat Islam Indonesia karena mereka terlibat 
dalam upaya intelektual dalam bidang teologi Islam, etika, hukum, dan praktek dalam mendidik 
pemimpin muda Muslim di berbagai bidang. Artikel ini membahas beberapa cara PTAIN telah 
dipolitisir untuk memainkan peran dalam perdebatan tentang masa depan Islam Indonesia yang 
berkembang (atau setidaknya menunjukkan) variasi yang lebih kompleks. Artikel ini 
menawarkan model teoritis untuk memahami keragaman yang ditemukan dalam Islam. 
Kata Kunci: Peguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, Politisasi. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Indonesian State Islamic Higher Education (PTAIN) system was created 
to encourage a progressive form of Islam to oppose political Islam and to be 
apolitical. Because PTAIN are the official government form of Islamic higher 
education, PTAIN faculty members can be important opinion makers in the 
Indonesian Islamic community. PTAIN are critical to understanding the 
Indonesian Islamic community because they engage in innovative scholarship 
on Islamic theology, ethics, law, and practice and in the education of young 
Muslim leaders in many fields.  
Indonesian institutions of higher education and their faculty members 
play a much more public role that their counterparts in American society in 
both popular culture and national government. Professors regularly write 
newspaper columns, op-ed pieces, and bestselling books. Those within the 
PTAIN system may also be religious leaders preaching Friday sermons, 
running pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), or hosting religious lessons 
(pengajian) in their homes. Further some are known on the global stage, such 
as the late Nurcholish Madjid as well as Azyumardi Azra, whose work has 
been recognized and honored internationally, including being named an 
Honorary Commander of the British Empire for his service to interfaith 
understanding (Osman, 2010).  
 This system plays a central role in the critical reexamination of Islam 
as well as acts as a bridge between various strains of Islam because students 
come from diverse Muslim backgrounds (Kraince, 2008, p. 349). Not only 
are the institutions and their faculty and staff important participants in the 
discourse about the future, they are subjects of it as well. Debates about the 
future of Islam in Indonesia are intertwined with debates about curriculum 
and program changes, the addition of secular subject, and progressive ideas 
advanced by some professors.  There is concern that the addition of non-
religious majors will leach away students the traditional religiously focus 
programs and erode the Islamic character of the university. Further, historical 
and social scientific approaches to the study of religions have been integrated 
into the older religious faculties.  People outside of the State Islamic Higher 
Education system have gone as far as accusing faculty members of apostasy 
(Lukens-Bull 2013, p. 3).  In a very real way, debates about higher education 
in Indonesia are debates about the nature of society.   
In my first book (2005), I examined how the Muslim community 
centered around pesantren is actively negotiating both modernity and tradition 
in the contexts of nation-building, globalization, and a supposed clash of 
civilizations. Zamahksyari Dhofier (1999) described a system in the early 
stages of change, as pesantren were taking on aspects of secular education. By 
the mid-1990s, many pesantren found it increasingly difficult to maintain the 
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balance between the traditional Islamic education and government schools. 
In fact Tebu Ireng, the most famous pesantren of all was, according to some 
extent, no longer able to train religious scholars (Lukens-Bull, 2005, p. 43) 
and many schools have refocused their purpose. No longer do they seek to 
train clerics and scholars, but now they seek to train people for the general 
workforce who have the morality of Muslim clerics and scholars (Lukens-
Bull, 2000). One result is that many of these pesantren were no longer able to 
produce graduates who have the knowledge and skills to become religious 
leaders. The pesantren community asked from whence the future leadership will 
come. One possible answer given in the mid-90s was Ph.D. holders (Lukens-
Bull, 2013, p. 10). 
The debates about pesantren in the 1990s foreshadowed the debates facing 
the PTAIN system in the early years of the 21st century. As I have explored 
elsewhere, pesantren education has made a number of accommodations to 
modern educational demands (2005). This shift in educational goals means that 
it was no longer possible to give all students the same level of traditional skills 
and a ―secular‖ education. Therefore, the emphasis in pesantren shifted to 
character development and moral education. In pesantren, the key methodology 
for this is to create an environment in which desired values are inculcated and 
reinforced. PTAIN in 2008 were facing some of the same issues and have 
proposed a similar solution (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 11).   
DISCUSSION 
History of PTAIN 
As I have discussed elsewhere (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 12), several 
IAIN were created in the 1970s, in part, to be tertiary education for pesantren 
and madrasah graduates. IAIN were not born out of nothing but was presaged 
by two institutions:  one focused on the training of Islamic teachers for 
government curricula schools, called Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri 
(PTAIN; not to be confused with the current usage of the acronym) and the 
other, the Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama (Government Worker‘ Academy of 
Religious Science) was designed to train government functionaries in the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) (Abdullah, 1999). Hence, the largest 
faculties in IAIN, across all campuses, were Syari’ah (Islamic law) and 
Tarbiyah (education). These two faculties provide the judges, teachers, and 
officials for Indonesia‘s religious bureaucracy and religious educational 
system (Steenbrink, 1974, p. 159) including those for the Marriage 
Registration section of the Department of Religious Affairs. Azyumardi Azra, 
former Rector of UIN Jakarta, argues that the IAIN are not and have never 
been a "seminary" and have always had an agenda beyond simply training 
religious leaders (2011, p.  44).  
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PTAIN were created at a time when Islam was being pushed to the 
margins of Indonesian politics. A number of events in the early history of the 
Republic of Indonesia had placed Islam in the margins (Pringle, 2010, p. 69-
70). During the 1965-66 bloodlettings which followed an allegedly 
communist coup attempt, the Indonesian military recruited Muslim militias 
to help in the killing of an estimated 500,000 people. After this 
empowerment as partners with the state, Suharto understandably wanted to 
remove any potential threat to his own power. One way to do this was 
ensuring that the PTAIN System be explicitly apolitical (Lukens-Bull, 2013, 
p. 12).  
Some have argued that the IAIN (in Jakarta and Yogyakarta) were 
―gifts‖ to the pesantren community to appease them after the ―gift‖ of UGM 
(Gajah Mada University) was given to the nationalists (Saeed, 1999, p.  182). 
These so-called gifts were given so that Suharto could garner support for 
what would become a 32 year regime. This interpretation is subject to debate. 
First it is questionable that there is, or has ever been, unified communities to 
be happy about their respective ―gifts‖ (Meuleman, 2002). Second, it is clear 
that the establishment of the PTAIN System served a number of Suharto‘s 
political goals including the bureaucratization of Islamic practices such as 
family law, marriage, and inheritance. Suharto was arguably biased in favor of 
―progressive‖ Islam. The IAIN were to be depoliticized institutions that were 
removed from the Islamist politics (Saeed, 1999, p. 183). The reforms under 
a number of Suharto‘s handpicked Ministers of Religious Affairs 
demonstrate how his agenda was carried out. These include moving away 
from a doctrinal focus to more critical and inquisitive approaches, engaging 
social science and historical perspectives, sending faculty members to 
Western countries for their doctoral education, and eventually becoming 
more than schools for studying religion (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 13). 
Reform of IAIN 
Amin Abdullah, the Rector of UIN Yogya from 2000-2010, said that 
from 1977-1997 PTAIN were focused on normative instruction or ‗ulûm ad-
dîn. That is, how best to practice Islam and how to teach others about these 
best practices. Even the sometimes controversial work of some scholars, 
such as Harun Nasution‘s approach to the relationship between reason and 
revelation (see Martin and Woodward 1997) fit within what Abdullah called 
‗ulûm ad-dîn. Abdullah may be overestimating the recent changes as well as 
underestimating the influence of Harun Nasution, who is arguably the most 
important scholar and teacher in the history of Indonesian Islamic higher 
education and will be discussed in detail in following section. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that Nasution encouraged students to examine aspects of 
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Islam that they might not have previously considered. 
Nasution‘s influence was so strong that some claim that his students 
and many in the system as merely repeating their teachers and not possessing 
a high degree of intellectualism themselves (Meuleman, 2000, p. 289). This 
paternalistic and misleading claim is given lie by the quality of the research of 
many PTAIN professors (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 15).  
Long before the PTAIN System was established, the Institute of 
Islamic Studies at McGill University in Montreal started working with 
Indonesian graduate students in the 1940s (Webster, 2009, p.  92). The 
number of students sent to McGill expanded in the 1970s with the 
establishment of the IAIN. Under the leadership of Munawir Sjadzali (1983-
1988) as Minister of Religious Affairs, the professors were sent to get 
advanced degrees in the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, and other 
Western countries. This is sometimes referred to as the creation of ulama-plus 
– people who are 'alim (religious experts) but are more intellectual in their 
orientation. Before this time, the ties between IAIN and the Middle East 
were very strong with the faculty having a particular orientation toward al-
Azhar Mosque/University in Cairo (Saleh, 2001, p. 7). Even though the shift 
toward critical studies informed by social sciences and humanities started 
almost from the beginning, Amin Abdullah argues that there was not a 
critical mass of PhD trained faculty for the approaches to be mainstreamed 
until the 1990s (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 16).  
Evolution of Some IAIN into UIN 
Starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s, six IAIN were transformed 
from Institutes to Universities by adding at least two non-religious fakultas. 
The motivation for these changes included concerns about employability of 
students and wanting to make sure that the Muslim community was not 
economically marginalized. Opinions about these changes are mixed both on 
and off campus. On campuses that have made the change, there is some 
concern about what will happen to the original religiously oriented fakultas; 
that the new, ―secular‖ fakultas will provide too much competition and will 
eventually drive their fakultas out of existence. On campuses that have not 
made the change, there has been a call for a wider mandate. That is, they are 
adding programs like Psychology, Nursing, Management, and Public Health 
under the existing fakultas (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 16). 
Debate and concern about the future of State Islamic Higher 
Education is not new. In the 1990s, it was not apostasy or even liberalism 
that was the problem. Rather, the worry was that IAIN might not be as 
capable of training future ulama as traditional (salaf) pesantren. Elsewhere I 
recall the story of an IAIN graduate being less skilled in reading kitab kuning 
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than young students at a traditional pesantren (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 17). 
Being able to read kitab kuning is an important measure in the pesantren world; 
it is the one used to criticize Tebu Ireng in the mid-90s (cf., Lukens-Bull, 
2005, p. 58).  The debates in the 1990s of whether success in Islamic studies 
should be measured by traditional, some would say, medieval standards or by 
more modern and internationally recognized standards of scholarship gave 
rise to the debates taking place in the first part of the 21st century (Lukens-
Bull, 2013, p. 17). 
Accusations of the Worst Kind  
Elsewhere I have described a conversation with Asyurmadi Azra, 
former Rector of UIN Jakarta and then director of the graduate school, 
(Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 21) in which he was not very concerned about a 
2005 book which accused many PTAIN professors of apostasy and 
described the campuses as a whole as cesspools of unbelief (Jaiz, 2005). 
Azra was not the only PTAIN faculty member who felt the book and 
similar accusation were not worthy of any attention. By paying any 
attention to it, the concern was that I would be granting it some level of 
legitimacy. Further,  this line of investigation would prove fruitless. I find 
that I must respectfully disagree with my friends. Although these 
accusations of apostasy come from a vocal minority in Indonesian society, 
they reflect a dimension of the debates that cannot be ignored (Lukens-
Bull, 2013, p. 21). As Michael Gilsenen argues that the process of defining 
social elements as Islamic or non-Islamic is inherently political. He 
describes an overall process whereby certain classes and groups that are 
politically and economically dominant in society legitimize a form of 
religion that increasingly relates to a specifically class view of how Islam is 
to be defined, practiced, studied, taught, and authorized. This will be the 
"real" and legitimate Islam ... (1982,  211). 
In Indonesia today, the inverse is also true, declaring what is true 
Islam is part of efforts to gain political ascendancy. Convincing the general 
public that the State Islamic Institutes and Universities have gone astray is 
part of an overall attempt to establish a specific understanding of Islam and 
Islamic law as the single legitimate form to be endorsed by the state. To 
understand this debate we must begin by understanding the dynamics of 
variation in Muslim belief and practice (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 22). 
Some critics go so far as to accuse specific PTAIN faculty members 
of apostasy. Some PTAIN instructors claim these accusations are because of 
the transition of several IAIN into UIN. However, the major work raising 
concerns about apostasy does not mention the transition into UIN (Jaiz, 
2005). Hartono Ahmad Jaiz and Adian Huseini, two of the most vocal critics 
The Political Use … 
 Vol. 2, No. 2, June 2016 M/1437 H 199 
of the PTAIN System today, are part of what is called Islam garis keras 
(hardline Islam) as well as IAIN graduates who were not selected to become 
junior instructors. This term applies to a wide range of ideologies and 
organizations which, while not new, have gained greater prominence since 
the end of the Suharto Era and the growth of democracy. While most of the 
hardliners are non-violent, violent groups among them have become more 
active in the post-Suharto Era. Today, the PTAIN System is working in a 
context of the growing impact of hardline Islam (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 17). 
PTAIN are often referred to as the fortress (benteng) of Islam by those 
who are critical of some of the developments; they wish for PTAIN to be 
solid and unchanging like the walls of a fortified city. Most PTAIN faculty 
will not use the fortress/walled city metaphor. They prefer to identify the 
system as one of the pillars of moderate Islam along with the socio-religious 
organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which together 
represent just over half the Indonesian population (van Bruinessen, 2009, p. 
219). It might be more appropriate to call State Islamic Institutes and 
Universities the engines of moderate or progressive Islam to the vehicle 
comprised of NU and Muhammadiyah; PTAIN are dynamic moving systems 
that are central to the continuation of moderate Islam. They are intricately 
connected to both NU and Muhammadiyah, as both NU and 
Muhummadiyah high schools are important sources of IAIN students. 
Further, many if not all religious teachers in NU and Muhammadiyah high 
schools are IAIN graduates (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 32).  
It is critical to consider the relationships between that which ties 
various Muslim communities together and what makes them distinct. This is 
what Talal Asad calls for when he suggests that the anthropology of Islam 
must devise a conceptual organization of the diversity in Islam (Asad, 1986, 
p. 5). The most insightful contemporary theories regarding this relationship 
have attempted to explain variation within Islam by constructing linguistic 
analogies, including studying religion as discourse (Asad, 1986; Bowen 
1993b). The discourse model has two central shortcomings. The first is that 
it is not very specific on the dynamics between a translocal or ―universal‖ 
form and local forms. The second is that ―discourse‖ sounds neat and tidy 
with equal participants trying to shape the outcome; it tends to overlook the 
political nature of such processes (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 22). 
Linguistic Analogies  
Indonesian discourse makes a distinction between agama (religion) and 
keagamaan, which literally means religiousness, but is often used to mean 
religious practice, or expression. Many scholars have identified a need to 
examine the relationship between Islam writ large and what actual people do 
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with their religion in everyday life (Bowen 1993a: 7, Woodward 1988: 65, 87-
88, El-Zein 1974b). The most insightful contemporary theories regarding this 
relationship have attempted to explain variation within Islam by constructing 
linguistic analogies, including studying religion as discourse, (for a more 
complete review of the academic debates about the variation in Islam see 
Lukens-Bull 1999, Marranci 2008) (Asad 1986 ; Bowen, 1993b).  
I wish to expand the linguistic analogy and draw a parallel between 
agama (religion) and langue (language as a system) and between keagamaan 
(religiousness) and parole (speech acts) (cf. Saussure, 1972). The factors that 
shape religious expression include idiosyncratic, social and historical factors. 
Idiosyncratic factors, those on the individual level, include factors such as the 
choice of how or whether to practice in a consistent manner. Idiosyncrasies, 
by definition, are hard to describe and model. More importantly then, 
idiosyncratic factors include choosing which social or historical factors to 
draw upon. Social and historical factors have given rise to patterns of practice 
among groups of people that are analogous to dialects (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 
23).  
One way to distinguish between dialects is mutual intelligibility. In 
the context of religion, ―intelligibility‖ does not simply entail mutual 
understanding but refers to recognizing someone as being on the correct 
path. However, claims of non-intelligibility may be exaggerated in religion as 
well as in language. Certain language communities may deny similarities with 
other communities as part of identity politics. For example, Straits Chinese 
call their dialect of Malay, Babah-Nyonya, deny any similarity with standard 
Malay in a national context in which ―speaking Malay‖ would deny their own 
ethnic heritage. Similarly, it is common enough to encounter circumstances 
in which Muslims may deny that the practices of other Muslims are properly 
called Islam (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 23).  
Apostasy Accusations and Dialects 
One way in which thinking of different expressions of religion as 
dialects is useful concerning the dynamics between standard and non-
standard forms. Prejudice toward non-standard languages is common 
enough. It leads to a number of problems in education; non-standard 
languages are not recognized as separate dialects but as ―broken‖ forms of 
the standard (Labov, 1972; Rickford 1999). In religious discourse terms like 
syncreticism, superstition, or even apostasy are used to denigrate non-
standard forms. 
Ada Permurtadan di IAIN (There is Apostasy at IAIN) was published in 
2005 by Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, a 1970s graduate from IAIN Yogyakarta. He 
accused many famous alumni and instructors of leaving the true path of 
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Islam. His reasons range from the absurd (Nurcholish Madjid receiving a 
liver transplant from a Chinese person) to what he would consider socially 
subversive (equal rights for men and women) to the theologically serious 
(stating that all religions may lead to paradise). The accusation of being an 
apostate (murtad) is consequential and Jaiz lays out what he understands the 
consequences to be. The apostate is to be warned and given three days to 
repent. Failing repentance, Jaiz says that they should be killed, denied a 
proper burial, and have their property confiscated from their heirs and the 
proceeds used to advance the Muslim community (2005, p. 95ff in e-book 
version). I personally know of one death threat arising out of the accusations.  
It was delivered in a truly Indonesian (Javanese) fashion, heavily veiled and 
indirect.  Fortunately, no one has taken Jaiz's rhetoric to its conclusion and 
tried to murder an alleged apostate (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 34-35).  
As I discussed elsewhere, one way to look at these accusations is to 
take a step back and consider the different ways the linguistic analogy 
adopted here illuminates the debates. The chief value of this analogy is the 
ability to model the relationship between what differentiates believers in 
different settings and what ties them together. In specific, it is useful to look 
at how the concept of apostasy finds expression in different dialects. Cultural 
Islam, the mainstream ―dialect‖ in Indonesia, would limit apostasy to 
converting to another religion or denying Islam. When the discussion of 
apostasy occurs on PTAIN campuses no one is willing to make such an 
accusation; they will say that someone is too liberal but that they are not an 
apostate because they still keep the required rituals (ibadah). The salafi 
―dialect‖ agrees with the three basic ways of being an apostate used by 
Cultural Islam but would add many other ways including anything that 
smacks of feminism such as gender parity in employment, not agreeing with 
polygamy, or women‘s rights quickly leading to accusations of apostasy from 
Jaiz and his ilk (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 35). 
The aphorism "a language is a dialect with an army and a navy" 
highlights the theoretical importance of standard, or power, dialects. Similar 
relationships exist within Islam, although it may not be armed forces but 
petrodollars that define the power dialect or "orthodoxy."  Debates over 
orthodoxy and apostasy are negotiations over power relations. The interplay 
of power and symbols is found in the social construction of symbol systems, 
which is the process of defining shared meaning. All conscious efforts to 
construct, maintain, or alter meaning constitute politics (Sederberg, 1984, p.  
7; Urban, 1991, p. 12). Disputes about shared meaning of political expression 
and competing ideologies are not epiphenomenal to politics, but are politics 
itself (Fairclough, 1989, p. 23;  Cohen, 1979).  
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Relationship with the State 
Another set of accusations concerns accepting the Republic of 
Indonesia as a secular state  and opposing the establishment of a syari’ah 
state in Indonesia (Jaiz, 2005, p. 20, 64). Even worse, in Jaiz's book, is being 
supportive of the idea of jihad nusantara, meaning that the struggle for 
national development counts a form of jihad. If there were any doubts 
about Jaiz's religio-political orientation, none remains after his scathing 
attacks on Muslims who are also Indonesian nationalists. He is clearly 
influenced by  Sayyid Qutb, the father of modern Islamic radicalism, who 
argued that all forms of nationalism were blasphemy or attributing an equal 
to God (Woodward, 2001) which suggest a dialectal commonality between 
them. Harono‘s position vis the Indonesian state clearly marks him as a 
fringe author. However, he is not alone; Islamist groups have capitalized 
society‘s frustrations with government corruption to argue for a syari’ah state 
PTAIN are often referred to as the fortress (benteng) of Islam by those who 
are critical of some of the developments; they wish for PTAIN to be solid 
and unchanging like the walls of a fortified city. Most PTAIN faculty will not 
use the fortress/walled city metaphor. They prefer to identify the system as 
one of the pillars of moderate Islam along with the socio-religious 
organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which together 
represent just over half the Indonesian population (van Bruinessen, 2009, p. 
219). It might be more appropriate to call State Islamic Institutes and 
Universities the engines of moderate or progressive Islam to the vehicle 
comprised of NU and Muhammadiyah; PTAIN are dynamic moving systems 
that are central to the continuation of moderate Islam. They are intricately 
connected to both NU and Muhammadiyah, as both NU and 
Muhummadiyah high schools are important sources of IAIN students. 
Further, many if not all religious teachers in NU and Muhammadiyah high 
schools are IAIN graduates (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 37).  
If anyone on PTAIN campuses might agree with Jaiz‘s accusations it 
would those be those associated with PKS, DDII, and other Islamist groups; 
but none concurs. At most, they allow the possibility of apostates on other 
campuses but deny any on their campus and rejected the label when asked 
about specific individuals on other campus, such as Asyurmadi Azra. I asked 
a PKS affiliated faculty member, what would make someone an apostate. He 
said that it would take a clear statement of rejection or a lapse in ritual 
practice (ibadah). He makes a distinction between apostasy and liberalism and 
holds that being liberal on worldy issues does not make someone an apostate. 
Imam Suprayogo, the Rector of UIN Malang, similarly limits apostasy to 
converting to another religion, ―There are no IAIN professors who have 
become Christian or Hindu‖ (Interview, February  2009).  
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Reaction to Accusations 
There are three basic reactions to the apostasy accusations. The first is 
to dismiss them as the ravings of an uneducated lunatic. They are called trash 
and even "bullshit" (using the English term). The arguments are dismissed as 
lacking an understanding of Islam, the goals of higher education, and even 
the facts about what is happening on  PTAIN campuses. Not surprisingly 
this reaction comes from those who have been accused of apostasy by name 
or by those who take positions similar to those who have been directly 
accused (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 38). 
The second response is to deny that there any true apostates on 
PTAIN campuses. The ways to do this include defining apostasy narrowly as 
converting to another religion or becoming an atheist. Another approach is 
to defend freedom of thought both in an academic setting and in Islam in 
general. People who take this position frequently disagree with the positions 
taken by their more liberal colleagues but are unwilling to engage in takfiri 
(calling others kafir, or unbelievers). However, they also defend academic 
freedom and the right for people to make arguments and for other to judge 
for themselves, which distinguishes them from those who take the third 
response (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 38). 
The third response also refuses to call anyone an unbeliever or a 
murtad. However, it calls into question the value of academic freedom. Those 
who take this position argue that all PTAIN academics should first and 
foremost position themselves as Muslims and must make all their arguments 
based on Quran and Hadith, or at least make them all consistent with Quran 
and Hadith. They even argue that if the findings of social science are 
inconsistent with the revealed text, they must be subordinated to scripture. 
They do not argue that the "liberals" are apostates but suggest that it might 
be best that they no longer serve as IAIN teachers if they want to base their 
arguments on social science perspectives. It is telling, however, that even the 
most "liberal" IAIN academics consider themselves and their opinions as 
consistent with the sacred sources, thus suggesting that those who take this 
third response are taking narrow interpretations of the sacred texts and 
insisting that all their colleagues follow suit (Lukens-Bull,  2013, p. 39). 
Azyurmadi Azra argues that Jaiz is not interested in dialogue or 
understanding. Azra says that similar accusations came from people 
associated with Dewan Dakwah (DDII). He related the story of encountering 
a DDII leader whose child graduated from the psychology program at UIN 
Jakarta. Azra asked the DDII leader if his child had become an apostate yet 
and the leader just stood there dumbfounded. Azra said that certain people  
just cannot stand  seeing Muslim organizations succeed if they do not profit 
from it themselves and that is the reason for these accusations. Azra suggests 
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that Jaiz has had no impact. It is possible that Azra underestimates the 
impact of the accusations. Either that or the impact is greater outside of 
Jakarta. At the very least, Jaiz keys into issues and concerns that are current 
in society, or to use the analogy employed here, he is using a particular 
religious dialect which is understood by a particular community. I had a 
doctoral student in my class at IAIN North Sumatra who made a point of 
taking me on almost anything I said. His behavior was explained to me as 
being due to the fact that he was a Friday preacher and that it was important 
that he maintain certain appearances. Since, ―sitting pretty in front of 
Orientalists‖ is one of the signs of apostasy; he was making sure that no one 
remembered him ―sitting pretty‖ in my class (Lukens-Bull,  2013, p. 39).  
A former dean of the Fakultas Ushuluddin in Yogya, which Jaiz says is 
the center of these alleged problems, said that they Jaiz‘s ideas are being 
consumed (dimakan) by many people, especially those in pesantren and this has 
impacted recruitment efforts. Another professor asserts that she needs to 
position herself carefully, she said that when she wants to do an event, she 
has to start by saying that she is from UIN from the fakultas of Tasfir-Hadits 
and that she was raised in a pesantren. She leaves out entirely her time in the 
United States. She simply says that she was educated through Madrasah 
Aliyah in pesantren and then went to a larger pesantren, namely IAIN, in a 
―pesantren‖ department, namely Tafsir-Hadits (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 40). 
The differences of opinion around IAIN are much more than that and 
they are reflections of differences in expression much like dialects of a 
language. The last place this should take us is a return to a Geertzian mode of 
analysis of the forms of Islam. There is no benefit in imagining abangan, santri, 
and priyayi nor in Wahabi, Sufi, Muhammadiya , or NU dialects and stopping 
there. If we use those labels to explain behavior, then this approach has not 
moved us forward. The labels may be useful in identifying major dialect 
families, but to really understand the dynamics involved in various 
expressions, we will need to understand the ways in which  the variation in 
religious practice is affected by a number of factors and  how expressions of 
religion can be diglossic, polysemic, and even idiosyncratic.  
CONCLUSION 
In the most general terms, when a religion expands into new areas, it gains 
new inflections; others will rise from historical developments in each local 
setting. Over time, local expressions would become completely unintelligible 
to one another, and as such, be ―dialects‖ of the same religious language, or 
perhaps be regarded as separate entities all together. Variations on how 
Muslims see and understand the nature of jinn in different cultures 
sometimes as familiars to be controlled  (Saniotis, 2004),  sometimes as 
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protectors of Muslim (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 141) and other times as sources 
of affliction  (Lukens-Bull, 2005, p. 98). However, the variation is no 
completely free-floating; the hajj and the education of ulama (Islamic scholars) 
kept widely dispersed Muslim from becoming entirely isolated (Lukens-Bull, 
2013, p. 141-142). 
This model about the relationship between the generative (langue) and 
the expressed (parole) in Islam is not wholly new, but rather builds upon the 
work of other anthropologists and seek to refine the definitions of these two 
concepts by examining the mechanisms through which they interact. From 
this point, we can see that anthropologists studying Islam must shift or 
refocus their research questions to take into account the nature of what they 
are studying. In one sense, Islam cannot be found in the texts. In another 
sense, what makes Islam a world religion and not just a collection of local 
practices is found primarily in the texts. But the real task of the 
anthropologist of Islam is to describe the relationship between text and 
practice, or more correctly, the universal and the local (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p.  
152).  
I have argued in this paper that many of the debates in Indonesia today 
reflect differences in dialect and have examined them as they relate to the 
PTAIN system.   There are those in Indonesian society who for Indonesian 
Islam to take a conservative turn, to be more like Islam in other lands, and as 
they imagine in was in the glory days of the community in Medinah.  They 
are concerned that the application of social science in the study of Islam will 
lead to a far too liberal interpretation of Islam. On the other side, people are 
concerned that Indonesians would no longer enjoy full freedom to express 
their faith as they understand it.  The concerns are not only about school 
learning and peer-reviewed articles but also concerns about what dialect of 
Islam will dominate. 
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